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Abstract: This article considers the possible inclusion of a right to cultural 
identity in a UK Bill of Rights, highlighting the centrality of culture to debates 
about the accommodation of diversity in the UK as well as the increased 
recognition of the importance of cultural rights under international human 
rights law.  The article argues that the inclusion of a minimal minority rights 
guarantee based on Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 1966 would be an innocuous step that would provide the 
impetus needed for greater cultural sensitivity in decision-making processes in 
a way that acknowledges the centrality of culture to people‟s identities and 
everyday lives.  It claims that the inclusion of such a right alongside a 
freestanding right to equality would provide a useful addition to the rights 
currently recognised as „Convention rights‟ under the UK Human Rights Act 
1998.  This is argued on the basis of both international and domestic case law 
on culture identity, including opinions of the UN Human Rights Committee, 
developments in European human rights law and experiences in other 
jurisdictions. 
  
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
To what extent can, and should, a contemporary Bill of Rights recognise and 
accommodate ethno-cultural and ethno-national diversity?  This is a question 
that has been the subject of much academic debate1 in light of what Lindhal 
has referred to as the „cultural and national turn of the foundations of 
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1 E.g. James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge 
University Press 1995). 
democratic legitimacy‟. 2   It has also proved of considerable practical 
significance in the development of new bills of rights both in the „Westminster 
world‟3 and in the context of divided societies in transition.4  It is a question 
that is clearly pertinent to current debates in the UK about the future of the 
Human Rights Act 1998, the prospect of a UK Bill of Rights and the future of 
the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights process. This article builds on the work of 
other academics engaged in these debates, who have raised questions about 
different approaches to constitutionalism (pragmatic and ideological),5 the role 
of state-based „liberal nationalism‟ in grounding rights6 and the process of 
translating rights from the universal to the particular.7  It does this by focusing 
on culture, identity and language issues, issues that have to a large extent 
been neglected within the context of the debates that have taken place so far 
about the possible content of a UK Bill of Rights.8   
 
It is argued in the first part of this article that the neglect of such issues to date 
has been unfortunate given (a) the centrality of culture to debates about the 
accommodation of diversity in UK, (b) the increased recognition of the 
importance of cultural rights within international human rights law and (c) the 
lack of cultural and group sensitivity often shown in the courts.  The article 
considers whether the inclusion of a right to cultural identity or a provision 
analogous to the minority rights guarantee in Article 27 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR) would be appropriate 
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options in the UK context.  It is submitted that the inclusion of a minimal 
minority rights guarantee rather than an express right to cultural identity in a 
UK Bill of Rights would provide a useful way of giving full effect to the UK‟s 
obligations under international and European minority rights law and in 
ensuring the cultural needs of those belonging to minority groups in the UK 
are adequately addressed within domestic decision-making processes.  It is 
asserted that the inclusion of such a provision would be an innocuous step 
that nevertheless would provide the impetus needed for greater cultural 
sensitivity amongst decision makers in a way that acknowledges the centrality 
of culture to people‟s identities and everyday lives.   
 
In developing the arguments made, the article draws in particular on case-law 
and judicial understandings of culture and identity in the UK and other 
common law jurisdictions, notably Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, as 
well as relevant jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights Committee.  The 
article adopts a view of culture as a „shared system of meaning that people 
use to make sense of the world‟, which is expressed in a variety of ways, 
including through religious and national rituals, language, clothing and 
symbols. 9   According to Ross, „[a]ttention to symbols, rituals and the 
narratives that members of a group use to make sense of the world is key to 
understanding how culture shapes their lives and their collective behaviors.‟10  
The International Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also 
adopts a broad approach to culture.  It recognizes culture as „a broad, 
inclusive concept encompassing all manifestations of human existence‟, 
should not be seen „as a series of isolated manifestations or hermetic 
compartments, but as an interactive process, whereby individuals and 
communities, while preserving their specificities and purposes, give 
                                                        
9 See Marc Howard Ross, Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge University Press 
2007) 2, who draws upon Geertz’s definition of culture as “an historically transmitted pattern of 
meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms 
by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and their 
attitudes toward life” (Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (Basic Books 
1973) 89).   
10
 Ibid. 
expression to the culture of humanity.‟11  This approach is less subjective and 
perhaps does not sufficiently acknowledge that culture is often contested.12  
The international legal framework does however recognise culture as „a living 
process, historical, dynamic and evolving, with a past, a present and a 
future.13  The article begins by considering the neglect of culture within the 
context of the debates that have taken place so far on a UK Bill of Rights, 
before considering earlier debates about the accommodation of diversity in 
the UK and the developing requirements of international human rights law.      
 
2.  SETTING THE CONTEXT: THE REPORT OF THE UK COMMISSION ON A BILL OF 
RIGHTS 
 
The terms of reference of the UK Commission on a Bill of Rights, which 
recently reported to the UK Government,14 included investigating „the creation 
of a UK Bill of Rights that incorporates and builds on all our obligations under 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), ensures that these 
rights continue to be enshrined in UK law, and protects and extend our 
liberties‟.15  The neglect of cultural issues within the current debates can be 
linked to the preoccupation to date with the idea of „British‟ values and 
„British‟ rights.  The focus on the desirability of a „UK‟ rather than a „British‟ 
Bill of Rights in the Commission‟s work is therefore to be welcomed. 16  
However, the majority‟s suggestion that a UK Bill of Rights might depart from 
the text of the ECHR using language which reflects „the distinctive history and 
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July 2008, ch. 3. 
heritage of the countries within the United Kingdom‟17 will cause alarm to 
many who have argued that the provisions of the Convention be retained in 
their current form.18   
 
Less problematic are the rights identified as extra „indigenous‟ rights that 
might be included in a UK Bill of Rights „in the sense of rights and freedoms 
which have attained a status of fundamental importance in this country‟s 
traditions and which therefore merit inclusion in any catalogue of the rights, 
freedoms and values which are considered to be constitutive of this country‟s 
identity.‟ 19   Rights that have been consistently mentioned in this regard 
include the right to equality, the right to trial by jury and the right to 
administrative justice.20  Whilst there appears to have been strong support for 
the inclusion of children‟s rights, socio-economic and environmental rights in 
the responses to the Commission‟s two rounds of public consultation,21 the 
Commission‟s report makes it clear that the majority of its members did not 
advocate the inclusion of such rights at this stage.22  The Commission‟s clear 
support for the inclusion of „the right to equality and non-discrimination 
currently enshrined in the Equality Act 2010 and Protocol 12 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights‟, described as the „most obvious candidate‟, is 
therefore significant.23  The UK‟s ratification of Protocol 12 and the addition of 
a freestanding right to non-discrimination in the list of Convention Rights in 
Schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998 would appear to be an obvious 
first step.  Although the prospect of the Coalition agreeing that individuals 
should be able to enforce such a right before the European Court of Human 
Rights appears unlikely in the current climate,24 this does not mean that the 
case should not continue to be made.  However, this article goes further by 
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arguing that the inclusion of a cultural rights provision should also be 
considered.   
 
It has been increasingly recognized within international human rights law that 
the right to non-discrimination needs to be accompanied by „special 
measures‟ to protect and promote minority identities.25  The idea of cultural 
and/or national identity being fundamental to well-being and individuals 
having an interest (and corresponding right) in preserving their culture as a 
context of choice is associated with what is often referred to as „the politics of 
difference‟, a position linked to the work of individuals such as Charles 
Taylor,26 James Tully27 and Will Kymlicka.28  Although there are considerable 
differences between their respective positions, what they share is an attempt 
to challenge the „politics of universalism‟, associated with the „difference-
blind‟ approach advocated by liberals such as Brian Barry, and the 
recognition of the need for special rights for those belonging to minority 
groups.29   
 
It was initially envisaged that the question of „the balance to be struck 
between acquiescence in minority religious and cultural practices (e.g. Sharia 
law)… and on the other hand the positive promotion of citizenship and shared 
values’ would be part of the national Bill of Rights debate.30  However, the 
section of the Commission‟s report dealing with minorities or vulnerable 
groups focuses primarily on older people, transsexuals and same-sex 
couples with cultural minorities only mentioned indirectly in the context of a 
discussion of the need to protect women and children from forced marriage 
and female genital mutilation.31  This can be contrasted with the approach of 
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the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its 2008 Report on the options for a 
UK Bill of Rights, which called for specific consultation on the question of 
whether there should be specific rights for religious, linguistic and ethnic 
minorities and migrant workers.32  Once again therefore the emphasis is not 
on the need to protect such minorities but rather on the incompatibility of 
certain cultural practices with „British‟ values.  It is clear from the 
Commission‟s report that the inclusion of new cultural or minority rights is not 
on the agenda.  This is perhaps unsurprising in light of the widespread 
(mis)perception of the flourishing of particular minority groups as a threat to 
„British‟ or „European‟ values.33  It remains nonetheless regrettable in light of 
recent debates about the accommodation of diversity in the UK as well as the 
UK‟s undertakings under international human rights law.    
 
3  THE CENTRALITY OF CULTURE TO DEBATES ABOUT THE ACCOMMODATION OF 
DIVERSITY IN THE UK  
 
The centrality of culture is often emphasised by those writing specifically in 
relation to the accommodation of ethnic and religious minorities in the UK34 as 
well as in relation to the „home nations‟ and devolution.35  The idea of ethnicity 
as relating to culture36 was given official backing in the judgment of Lord 
Fraser in the case of Mandla v Dowell Lee, 37  which identified certain 
characteristics as essential for a group to constitute an „ethnic‟ group for the 
purposes of the Race Relations Act 1976.  These include: „(1) a long shared 
history, of which the group is conscious as distinguishing it from other groups, 
and the memory of which it keeps alive; and (2) a cultural tradition of its own, 
including family and social customs and manners, often but not necessarily 
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and culture’, which have been omitted from the above quote, and the inclusion of an additional 
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Commonwealth (Oxford University Press 1999). 
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37 [1983] 2 AC 548 
associated with religious observance‟.38   Although the Race Relations Act 
1976 was not intended to cover groups defined exclusively by religion, this 
case illustrates the problems with trying to dissociate the two.39  In this regard 
it is significant that the UK has adopted a very inclusive approach under the 
Council of Europe‟s Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities in relation to the term „national minority‟.  Despite claiming its 
approach is ostensibly based on a definition of the term „racial group‟ under 
the Race Relations Act, its reports have, for example, covered the situation of 
Muslims in the UK, who do not meet the criteria of a racial group for the 
purposes of the Act.40 
 
A general policy of cultural pluralism in relation to ethno-cultural groups based 
on integration and equality of opportunity can be traced back to the 1960s 
with cultural accommodation generally taking the form of the „norm and 
exemption‟ approach. 41   A more radical approach was advocated in the 
Parekh Report on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, published in 2000.42 The 
Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain had been established to 
provide „a comprehensive review of British identity and race relations‟ and 
was lauded as „the first report to try to get to grips with discrimination over 
cultural or religious difference, not simply "biological" race, as a form of 
racism.‟43  The Report adopted the starting point that Britain was both „a 
community of citizens and a community of communities, both a liberal and a 
multicultural society‟ and stressed the need to „find ways of nurturing diversity 
while fostering a common sense of belonging and a shared identity among its 
                                                        
38 Ibid., 562. 
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41 Sebastian Poulter, Ethnicity, Law and Human Rights: The English Experience (Clarendon Press 
1998). 
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http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2000/oct/21/philosophy (accessed 13 April 2013).   
members.‟44  Like Yael Tamir, the authors of the report viewed the nation (in 
this instance Britain) as an „imagined community‟, stressing the need for a 
rethinking of the „national story and national identity‟.45  Most controversial 
was the highlighting of the racist connotations sometimes associated with 
„Britishness‟ and references to colonialism and imperialism,46 although this 
only formed a small section of the chapter entitled „Rethinking the National 
Story‟.47  Other themes identified that are of potential relevance to the Bill of 
Rights debates included an understanding that „all identities are in a process 
of transition‟; the need for a balance between „cohesion, equality and 
difference‟; the elimination of racism; reduction of inequalities and the 
development of „a pluralistic human rights culture.‟48  The authors themselves 
advocated an approach that was both liberal and pluralistic, 49  notably 
requiring recognition of diversity in the public sphere.50  It was clear from the 
rest of the report that it was envisaged that this would include „recognition of 
the rights people have as members of religious, cultural and linguistic groups‟ 
such as „the right to worship, to bear religious insignia, to express cultural 
identity, and to transmit language and culture to the next generation.‟51  
 
Unsurprisingly given the imminent coming into force of the Human Rights Act 
1998, aimed at giving greater effect to rights in the ECHR under domestic law, 
the chapter in the report on the development of a pluralistic human rights 
culture focuses primarily on the need for individual rights to be interpreted in a 
culturally sensitive way and on the development of a broader human rights 
culture.52 Other instruments such as the UN Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Council of Europe‟s Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
                                                        
44 The Parekh Report, supra n. 42. 
45 Ibid, 15-23. 
46 BBC News ‘No to Rethink on National Identity’, 11 October 2000 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/966629.stm (accessed 13 April 2013). 
47 The Parekh Report, supra n. 42, ch. 2, see in particular paras. 2.17, 2.19 and 2.22. 
48 Ibid., xiv. 
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50 Ibid., 48. 
51 Ibid., 91. 
52 Ibid., ch. 7. 
Linguistic Minorities are referred to in passing. 53   The ECHR is however 
notoriously weak in this area, lacking even a minimal minority rights 
guarantee, as discussed further below.  
 
There is however another aspect to the UK debate on culture, which relates to 
the indigenous minorities and in particular the Welsh, the Scots and the Irish.  
The term „liberal nationalism‟ is often used to describe the UK‟s approach to 
accommodating these minorities.54   The term is particularly associated with 
the work of Yael Tamir, who places particular emphasis on the role of culture 
within national movements.55  Tamir herself perceives cultural identity as both 
chosen and constitutive and argues that „the right to culture is meant to allow 
individuals to live within the culture of their choice, to decide on their social 
affiliations, to re-create the culture of the community they belong to, and to 
redefine its borders‟ but stresses that the communal features of culture and 
membership also require recognition of a right „to a public sphere in which 
individuals can share a language, memorise their past, cherish their heroes, 
live a fulfilling national life.‟ 56   Her approach to nationhood is based on 
Anderson‟s idea of the „imagined community‟, which would appear to justify an 
inclusive approach given the difficulties of drawing clear delineations between 
nations and other cultural communities.57  This is in line with the approach 
adopted in this article which proposed a more generic right rather than one 
specifically focused on the home „nations‟.    
 
The liberal national approach attempts above all to reconcile the universal 
with the particular, which is especially relevant in the area of human rights.58  
MacCormick, whose work was intended to apply a liberal national approach to 
the debates on devolution in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, 
suggested that „everyone is entitled to particularistic rights‟, although his 
primary focus was on „the right to participate in a self-determining national 
                                                        
53 Ibid., 92-94. 
54 Harvey, supra n. 6, 28.  See also MacCormick, supra n. 35. 
55 See, in particular, Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton University Press 1993). 
56 Ibid., 8. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. See chapter 4 on ‘particular narratives and general claims’. 
community.‟59  Indigenous language rights for Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland could also be included in this category and would be entirely 
compatible with, but not required by, the more generic right being proposed 
here.  However, such rights should be in addition to, rather than instead, such 
a generic rights guarantee.  It is significant in this regard that the Good Friday 
Agreement of 1998 emphasised the importance of „respect, understanding 
and tolerance in relation to linguistic diversity, including in Northern Ireland, 
the Irish language, Ulster-Scots and the languages of the various ethnic 
communities, all of which are part of the cultural wealth of the island of 
Ireland‟  (emphasis added).60  It is clear that recognition of such a right might 
have particular significance in the Northern Ireland context, where issues 
relating to flags,61 emblems,62 parades63 and language64 continue to cause 
considerable controversy.65  However, it is submitted that the case can also 
be made on the basis of the centrality of culture to more general debates 
about the accommodation of diversity in the UK as well as on the basis of 
recent developments suggesting increased international recognition of the 
importance of cultural rights as an integral part of human rights.   
 
4  INCREASED INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CULTURAL 
RIGHTS AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF HUMAN RIGHTS?  
 
Although cultural rights were largely sidelined within international human 
rights law in the post World War II era, the situation has changed in recent 
years.  Most prominent is Article 27 of the ICCPR, which provides that: „In 
                                                        
59 Ibid., 131. 
60 See paras. 3-5 of section on Economic, Social and Cultural Issues, Agreement Reached in Multi-
Party Negotiations (Belfast, 10 April 1998). 
61 E.g. the recent fall-out from the decision of Belfast City Council on 3 December 2012 to stop 
flying the Union flag daily at Belfast City Hall (see Belfast Union Flag Dispute is Lightning Rod for 
Loyalist Disaffection’ 6 January 2013 http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/jan/06/belfast-
union-flag-dispute-loyalist (accessed 13 April 2013).  On the flags issue more generally, see 
Dominic Bryan and Clifford Stevenson, ‘Flagging Peace: Struggles over Symbolic Landscape in the 
New Northern Ireland’ in Ross (ed), supra n. 13, ch. 4, 68.   
62 See Alex Schwartz, Symbolic Equality: Law and National Symbols in Northern Ireland, 19 
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 339 (2012). 
63
 See Ross, supra n. 9, ch. 4. 
64
 See Verona Ni Dhrisceoil, Revisiting the Language Rights Debate in Northern Ireland Public Law 
(forthcoming, 2013). 
65
 For a more general discussion of issues of ongoing cultural contestation, see Joanne McEvoy, 
Managing Conflict in Post-Conflict Societies, 6 Contemporary Social Science 55 (2011).      
those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with 
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 
practise their own religion, or to use their own language.‟   Meanwhile Article 
15(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
recognises the right of everyone to take part in cultural life.  The relationship 
between the two has been described as „reciprocally reinforcing‟ and the 
increased emphasis by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights on cultural appropriateness in its analysis of other rights provisions 
helps strengthen the cultural rights framework.66   
During the drafting of Article 27, it had been noted that a negative formulation 
seemed to imply „that the obligations of States would be limited to permitting 
the free exercise of the rights of minorities.‟67  However, the stance adopted 
by the UN Human Rights Committee is that „positive measures of protection‟ 
against acts both of the State and of third parties are required68 and that the 
rights therein „depend in turn on the ability of the minority group to maintain its 
cultural, language or religion.  Accordingly, positive measures by States may 
also be necessary to protect the identity of a minority and the rights of its 
members….‟69  This is in line with the positive obligations approach to civil 
and political rights recognised under the ECHR.70  Such measures will not be 
considered discriminatory if aimed at correcting conditions which prevent 
enjoyment of Article 27 rights, provided the differentiation is legitimate and if 
                                                        
66 Christian Groni, Background Paper, Day of General Discussion: The Right to Take Part in Cultural 
Life (9 May 2008) UN Doc. E/C.12/40/3, 11-12.  See also Roger O’Keefe, The Right to Take Part in 
Cultural Life under Article 15 of the ICESCR, 47 ICLQ 904 (1998). 
67 Commission on Human Rights, 9th Session, 1953 in  Marc J. Bossuyt, Guide to the ‘Travaux 
Préparatoires of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 496 (Martinus Nijhoff, 
1986).  Special Rapporteur Capotorti also noted that the stance adopted within the Sub-
Commission was that States were obliged to allow individuals enjoyment of their culture, 
practice of their religion and use of the own language, ‘but that did not imply that members of 
minorities had the right to demand that the State should adopt positive measures.’ (Francesco 
Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 
para. 212 (UN, 1979).   
68 HRC General Comment No. 23, Article 27 (Rights of Minorities) (8 April 1994) UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, para. 6.1. 
69 Ibid., para. 6.2. 
70 e.g. Alastair Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention 
on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2004). 
they are „based on reasonable and objective criteria.‟71 The overall aim is to 
ensure „the survival and continued development of the cultural, religious and 
social identity of the minorities concerned, thus enriching the fabric of society 
as a whole.‟72  
Although Article 27 is generally recognized as providing the higher level of 
protection,73 the HRC‟s General Comment on Article 27 is relatively short74 
with much more detailed elaboration of a human rights approach to „culture‟ in 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights‟ General Comment 
on the Right of Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life. 75   The General 
Comment identifies specific legal obligations in relation to the obligation on 
the State to respect, protect and fulfill the right to take part in cultural life76 
including respect for the rights „to freely choose their own cultural identity, to 
belong or not to belong to a community, and have their choice respected‟ and 
„to have access to their own cultural and linguistic heritage and to that of 
others.‟77  It will be recalled that its view of culture is „broad and inclusive … 
encompassing all manifestations of human existence.  The expression 
“cultural life” is an explicit reference to culture as a living process, historical, 
dynamic and evolving, with a past, a present and a future.‟78  
A lot of the individual communications considered by the HRC in relation to 
Article 27 have involved indigenous peoples 79  and are therefore not 
particularly revealing about the significance of the possible inclusion of a right 
to cultural identity in a UK Bill of Rights.  The General Comment on Article 27 
says very little about religion or language, apart from stressing that the right to 
use a minority language under Article 27 relates to the language of the 
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79 Cases concerning indigenous peoples where the HRC has found a violation of Article 27 include 
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individual‟s choice, unlike the more specific right in Article 14(3)(f) which 
confers a right to interpretation only where the individual concerned cannot 
understand or speak the language used.80  The General Comment is also 
quite vague in relation to culture, recognising that it manifests itself in many 
forms and that it might include „a particular way of life‟ with the examples 
given particularly relevant to indigenous people such as the use of land 
resources, fishing, hunting and the right to live in reserves.81  The HRC has 
however stressed that enjoyment of such rights (to culture) „may require 
positive legal measures of protection and measures to ensure the effective 
participation of members of minority communities in decisions which affect 
them.‟82   
There have been a number of cases where applicants have been 
unsuccessful in their attempts to use Article 27 but have succeeded under 
other articles, raising questions about what protection Article 27 really adds 
for members of minority groups other than indigenous peoples.83  Although 
there are recent signs of Article 27 being given more serious consideration, 
the jurisprudence on other types of cultural, linguistic and religious minorities 
remains underdeveloped.  The HRC has stressed its distinctiveness to other 
rights in the ICCPR84 and found a violation of both Article 19 and Article 27 
with Article 2 (requirement to ensure rights recognised without discrimination) 
in the case of Mavlonov and Sa’di v Uzbekistan85 concerning the denial of re-
registration of a newspaper published almost exclusively in the Tajik language, 
a newspaper also distributed to schools. The HRC made the finding of a 
violation of Article 27 with Article 2 both on the basis that „education in a 
minority language is a fundamental part of minority culture‟ and on the basis 
that „the use of a minority language as means of airing issues of significance 
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and importance … is an essential element of the Tajik minority‟s culture.‟86  
Meanwhile in the case of Prince v South Africa 87  the HRC considered 
separately whether or not the failure to grant Rastafarians an exemption to the 
general prohibition of the possession and use of cannabis was a violation of 
Articles 18 (on religion), 27 and 26 (on non-discrimination).  It concluded that 
the restriction of the right to freedom of religion was justified, that a general 
prohibition did not constitute „an unreasonable justification‟ for interference 
with his Article 27 rights and that the prohibition was based on „objective and 
reasonable grounds‟ and therefore not discriminatory.88  There is however a 
notable lack of consistency in the HRC‟s approach.  In a case concerning the 
unlawful eviction of a Roma family and the unlawful demolition of their home 
the Committee concluded that there was a violation of Articles 17 (privacy, 
family, home or correspondence), 23 (protection of the family) and 27 
primarily on the basis of the allegations having been sufficiently established, 
so through a factual rather than legal analysis.89  In comparison the HRC in 
Rahiman v Latvia, having found a violation of Article 17 in the changing of the 
name of the applicant (a Latvian national who belonged to the Jewish and 
Russian-speaking minorities) to the non-Russian, non-Jewish form, due to the 
arbitrary nature of the interference, did not find it necessary to address the 
separate issue of whether or not there was also a violation of Articles 26 and 
27.90   
A case could not therefore be made for the inclusion of a cultural rights 
provision in a UK Bill of Rights solely on the basis of the two cultural rights 
provisions in the International Human Rights Covenants.  There are however 
other developments that should be taken into account that have led some to 
speculate about the possible development of a separate human right to 
cultural identity. 91   For example, the UNESCO Declaration on Race and 
Racial Prejudice 1978 recognises the right of both individuals and groups „to 
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be different, to consider themselves as different and to be regarded as such‟ 
(Art 2) and the right to maintain cultural identity‟ (Article 3).  Subsequent 
developments include the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities 
1992, which according to the Preamble was „inspired‟ by the principles behind 
Article 27, and the Council of Europe‟s Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities 1995, discussed further below.  Meanwhile 
Article 22 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights provides specifically that 
„The Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity‟ (emphasis 
added).  An exclusive focus on the HRC‟s approach to Article 27 would 
therefore be problematic in light of the developments that have taken place in 
relation to the recognition of cultural rights as „an integral part of human rights‟ 
over the last two decades.92 
The minority rights instruments developed in the early 1990s impose new 
obligations on States in relation to group identity.  For example, Article 1 of 
the UN Declaration on Minorities requires States to „protect the existence and 
the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities 
within their respective territories‟, to „encourage conditions for the promotion 
of that identity‟ and to „adopt appropriate legislative or other measures to 
achieve those ends.‟  Meanwhile the requirement in Article 5 of the 
Framework Convention is „to promote the conditions necessary for persons 
belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to 
preserve the essential elements of that identity, namely their religion, 
language, traditions and cultural heritage.‟  The latter is probably the more 
significant as the UK is a State Party to the Framework Convention and 
therefore subject to the associated periodic reporting system.  The Framework 
Convention imposes a number of positive obligations on States in areas such 
as education, the media and in public affairs.93   
Significantly, the proposal to draft an additional protocol to the ECHR 
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guaranteeing individual rights in the „cultural field‟ made at the same time as 
the proposal for a framework convention on national minorities was not taken 
forward.  The requirement was that the proposed rights should be 
fundamental, should correspond to a real need and should be justiciable.  
Rights considered included the right to cultural identity, the right to choose to 
belong to a group, the protection of cultural and scientific heritage, the right to 
participate in cultural activities and the right to set up cultural and educational 
institutions as well a number of language rights.94  A right to cultural identity 
was rejected on the grounds that the concept was too broad and that aspects 
of cultural identity were covered under other rights provisions.95  In the end 
the list was narrowed down to the right to a name, freedom to use the 
language of one‟s choice, the right to learn the language of one‟s choice and 
the right to establish cultural institutions. 96   An important factor in the 
subsequent decision to suspend work on the drafting was that such rights 
would not add much to provisions of the ECHR.97  Particularly relevant in this 
regard would appear to be Articles 8 to 11 of the ECHR as well as Article 2 of 
the First Protocol on educational rights.98  However, the European Court of 
Human Rights has in the past accused of lacking cultural sensitivity,99 with 
cases involving religious groups often the focus of particular attention in this 
regard.100  
5  A CURRENT LACK OF CULTURAL SENSITIVITY IN THE COURTS? 
The assessment of Thornberry and Martín Estébanez in 2004 was that the 
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European Court of Human Rights was „in the process of sharpening its 
sensitivity to “ethnic” issues‟101 and there was certainly some evidence of this 
at that time.102  Other research has focused on subsequent developments and 
on the impact that specific judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
in cases brought by individuals from minority and marginalized groups have 
had at domestic level. 103   The focus in this section is specifically on the 
approach of UK courts.  The fact remains that there are specific cultural rights 
in other human rights instruments which have not been transposed into 
domestic law through the Human Rights Act 1998.  This makes the meninful 
realization of cultural rights difficult.  It has furthermore been claimed that 
multiculturalism is now in retreat and that we are living in a new „post-
multicultural‟ era with a more aggressive assertion of basic liberal principles 
and values.104  This is the context within which the UK Bill of Rights debates 
are taking place, as illustrated in the flavour and content of the debates and 
proposals so far.   
The wider implications of such trends can be subtle, often hidden by 
persuasive legal analysis and reasoning.  This can be illustrated by looking 
some of the cases heard in UK courts involving religious minorities, such as 
the case of R (Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High 
School.105  In that case the school‟s rules on school uniform, which permitted 
the wearing of the „shalwar kameeze‟ but not the „jilbab,‟ had been developed 
in consultation with parents, staff and students as well as the local 
mosques. 106   The view of Shabina Begum‟s family was that the shalwar 
kameeze „originated as a Pakistani cultural dress without any particular 
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religious foundation‟ and the argument made was that her own religious belief 
was that Shari‟a required fuller coverage for women over 13.107  There was 
evidence of some Muslim opinion to support this, leading Lord Justice Brooke 
in the Court of Appeal to distinguish on this basis between „very strict‟ and 
„liberal‟ Muslims, albeit recognising that the appropriateness of these labels 
might be challenged by the relevant experts.108 He proceeded to identify the 
former as a „minority view‟ not forming part of „mainstream opinion among 
South Asian Muslims‟.109  Begum‟s own family was of Bangladeshi origin.  
The Court of Appeal recognised that departmental guidance was provided 
advising sensitivity to different cultures, races and religions110 and found a 
violation of Article 9 of the ECHR on the grounds that the school did not 
attribute sufficient weight to her beliefs in terms of the decision-making 
process in relation to her request for an exemption to the general uniform 
policy, which should have addressed the specific requirements of Article 9.111  
 
The House of Lords, however, held that there had not been a violation of 
Article 9 on the grounds that there had not been an interference with her right 
to manifest her religious belief as there were other options available to her 
and that, in any case, the legitimate objective of protecting the rights and 
freedoms of others was served.112  The House of Lords did not consider the 
cultural aspect to the same extent, querying the fact that she had changed her 
mind in relation to what her religion required of her.113  This case has been 
cited as an example of „self-defined cultural groups making widespread and 
(at least to some extent) successful efforts to assert and preserve what they 
see as their cultural distinctiveness in a political society, and to achieve public 
recognition and validation of this distinctiveness‟114 and to illustrate the role of 
law „as a medium and site of communication in relation to multiculturalism.‟115  
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The same author argues judicial opinions have a key role to pay in 
communicating to particular „cultural constituencies‟.116  It is relevant in this 
regard that the House of Lords‟ decision has been criticised for the lack of 
consideration of multicultural ideals117 and it is clear this would be facilitated to 
a much greater extent if courts were required to take account the more 
associational cultural aspects when considering such a case.  
 
Another case considered to illustrate the role of law as a site of cultural 
communication is the case of R (E) v Governing Body of JFS and another 
(United Synagogue and others intervening).118  In that case the UK Supreme 
Court found that the application by a Jewish school of the criteria for being 
recognised as Jewish adopted by the Office of the Chief Rabbi directly 
discriminated against the applicant who did not meet the Orthodox Jewish 
criteria on racial grounds.  McCrudden argues that this case is reflective this 
new „post-multicultural‟ era, where tensions between core liberal principles 
and faith-based multiculturalism are openly debated, with the latter often 
constrained by the former.119   However, he claims further that there is a 
general trend towards focusing on the religious dimension of „ethno-cultural 
practices‟.120  The inclusion of a right to culture in a UK Bill of Rights would 
perhaps go some way to redressing the balance.  The right would remain 
essentially an individual right,121 the implications of which are explored further 
in the next section. This is particularly important in light of the desire of many 
groups for „associational self-realisation‟, which often takes the form of 
defining their own „normative world‟ or „universe‟.122   
 
6  WHAT ROLE CAN CULTURAL RIGHTS PLAY IN A BILL OF RIGHTS? 
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The conclusion reached by Donders in 2002 was that „the concept of cultural 
identity is too broad and vague to be translated into a separate human right‟123 
and is at risk of abuse in the sense of being used to justify restrictions on 
individual rights and freedoms.124  Her basic premise was that other rights 
provisions have a key role to play in the protection of cultural identity125 and 
that the protection of cultural identity could be „read‟ into existing rights and 
„serve as an underlying principle‟ for such rights. 126   However, she was 
assessing the case for the articulation of a separate right to cultural identity in 
addition to the right to participate in cultural life and the right to enjoy one‟s 
culture in community, rights already established under international human 
rights law. These are not rights currently justiciable under UK law.  The next 
section considers the lessons that can be learnt from experiences in other 
common law jurisdictions, notably New Zealand, Canada and South Africa.  It 
is submitted that these experiences suggest that the inclusion of a minimal 
minority rights guarantee along the lines of Article 27 of the ICCPR would be a 
fairly innocuous measure that would nevertheless address the tendency of UK 




To some extent the New Zealand Bill of Rights provides the most obvious 
model for the UK to follow, particularly in light of the history of the UK Human 
Rights Act and parallels with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.127  
Unlike the UK Human Rights Act, the New Zealand Bill of Rights lists the 
rights themselves in the main text, rather than in an Appendix, also including a 
general limitation clause in s. 5, which provides that „the rights and freedoms 
contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
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society.‟  Section 20, the minority rights provision, is virtually identical to 
Article 27 of the ICCPR.  However, the heavy reliance on the approach of the 
HRC in the relevant policy guidance128 and the emphasis on the use of s. 20 
by indigenous peoples in the literature129 means that it is difficult to glean from 
the New Zealand experience what might be gained from the inclusion of such 
a right in a UK Bill of Rights.  The evidence suggests that section 20 has had 
little impact in the case-law, even in relation indigenous peoples,130 and that 
the rights in section 20 contiue to be regarded primarily as „liberty‟ rights.131  
For example, in the case of Mendelssohn v Attorney-General132 the Court of 
Appeal treated section 20, and in particular the right to profess or practice 
one‟s religion in community with others, as a liberty right modelled on Article 
18 of the ICCPR, the freedom of religion clause which includes the freedom to 
manifest one‟s religion or belief in community with others, stating that both 
sections 15 and 20 did not impose positive duties on the State and fell within 
the category of „negative freedoms‟.133  The examples of Canada and South 
Africa however provide a more positive illustration of the impact that the 




It might seem odd to focus on s. 27 of the Canadian Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms, known as the „multiculturalism‟ clause.  This is an 
interpretative obligation, which provides that: „This Charter shall be interpreted 
in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the 
multicultural heritage in Canada.‟  Multiculturalism was of course the official 
policy of the Trudeau government and the charter itself, perceived as 
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„integrationist‟ rather than „accommodationist‟134 in its approach to diversity, 
was criticised for its approach to the provinces and to difference generally, 
linked as it was to the overall aim which was „to recognise and affirm a 
unifying Canadian constitutional identity.‟ 135   However, this provision is 
significant because it was included particularly at the request of other „ethno 
cultural communities‟ and with regard to the weaknesses of Article 27 as a 
negatively formulated right aimed at protecting cultural identity with some 
uncertainty over its potential scope of application.136  There are also lessons 
that can be learnt from the Canadian experience.  The Canadian courts have, 
for example, drawn a clear distinction between the official language rights 
regime in the Charter and ss. 15 (right of everyone to equality before the law) 
and 27.137   This is useful in the context of debates in the UK given the 
developing language rights regimes in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland.138   
 
Section 27 has been described as a „flexible but unpredictable tool‟ and 
criticised for its lack of coherency, and much of the literature focuses on its 
under-utilised potential.139  There are nevertheless some indications in the 
case-law of how a provision focused on the more collective aspects of culture, 
language and religion might be used to strengthen relevant individual rights 
guarantees.  One example is the case of R v Videoflicks Ltd, 140  which 
concerned challenges to convictions relating to retail activity on a Sunday 
contrary to section. 2 of the Retail Business Holidays Act 1980 adopted by the 
Province of Ontario and the issue of whether or not section 2 itself was 
compatible with the Charter.  The Ontario Court of Appeal, having found that 
the Act itself was passed for secular rather than religious purposes, focused in 
particular on the situation of those who closed their business on some other 
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day of the week as part of their Sabbath observance.141  Having particular 
regard to section 27 and religion as „one of the dominant aspects of a culture‟ 
that it was intended „to preserve and enhance‟,142 the Court of Appeal found 
that the conclusion that the law infringed the right to freedom of religion of an 
Orthodox Jewish shop-owner under s. 2 of the Charter:143  
 
„is supported by the fact that such a law does not help to 
preserve and certainly does not serve to enhance or promote 
that part of one‟s culture which is religiously based. Section 27 
determines that ours will be an open and pluralistic society 
which must accommodate the small inconveniences that might 
occur where different religious practices are recognised as 
permissible exceptions to otherwise justifiable homogenous 
requirements.‟144   
 
Although there were some exemptions to s. 2 of the Act, it was considered by 
the Court that these did not go far enough in accommodating differences 
between religions on this issue.145  The Supreme Court adopted a similar 
approach but found that restrictions on the right of „Saturday observers‟ were 
„reasonably and demonstrably justified in a free democratic society‟, with the 
Lord Chief Justice in his judgment focusing particular attention on the scope 
of the legislative exemption in s. 3(4).146   This was in comparison to the 
federal Lord‟s Day Act 1970, which was intended to compel universal 
observance of a religious day of rest and was found incompatible with s. 2 of 
the Charter as well as contrary to the expressed provisions of s. 27.147   
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The limited impact of s. 27 can perhaps be partly attributed to some of the 
difficulties and controversies associated with the term „multicultural‟ itself.148  
For the majority in Adler v Ontario149 s. 27 made no difference to the outcome 
of an unsuccessful claim that the funding only of secular and Roman Catholic 
schools and not of Jewish private religious schools was unconstitutional under 
ss. 2(1) and 15 of the Charter.  Meanwhile the two dissenting judges differed 
in their approach to the requirements of a multicultural approach. The view of 
Justice L‟Heureux-Dubé was that s. 27 supported the view that he 
preservation and continuance of the communities in question were interests 
fundamental to the purposes of the Charter150 and that the interference was 
not proportionate.151  In comparison Justice McLachlin (only partly dissenting) 
adopted the stance that the decision to deny funding to such school was 
intended „to foster a strong secular public school system attended by students 
of all cultural and religious groups‟152 and concluded that „the encouragement 
of a more tolerance harmonious multicultural society constitutes a pressing 
and substantial objective capable…of justifying the infringement of s. 15.‟153  
Whilst the inclusion of a reference to multiculturalism in a UK Bill of Rights 
would be highly controversial given recent debates over its future and 
usefulness and is not being advocated here, it is worth reiterating that the 
provision inspired by Article 27 of the ICCPR is actually an interpretative 
clause in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms rather than a 
separate minority rights guarantee.  The South African case-law therefore 
provides a clearer example of the added value that such a cultural rights 




The South African Bill of Rights notably includes a right to cultural identity 
similar to that found in Article 27 of the ICCPR (section 31) and a right to 
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participate in cultural life similar to that found in Article 15 of the ICESCR 
(section 30).  Only the latter was included in the Interim Constitution of 1993 
and section 30 now provides that: „Every person shall have the right to use 
the language and to participate in the cultural life of his or her choice’ 
(emphases added).  This right is subject to the limitation that „no one 
exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision 
of the Bill of Rights.‟  According to Devenish, the specific inclusion of such a 
right played an important symbolic role in satisfying the concerns of minorities 
in post-apartheid South Africa but was essentially covered by section 15 on 
freedom of association. 154   Its inclusion therefore appears superfluous, 
particularly given the inclusion of a minority rights provision along the lines of 
Article 27 of the ICCPR.   Section 31 is clearly modelled on Article 27 except 
that there is again an express limitation clause providing that the rights therein 
„may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of 
Rights‟, the term „community‟ is used instead of the term „minority‟ and the 
adjective „cultural‟ rather than „ethnic‟.155  It also contains an additional right „to 
form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other 
organs of civil society.‟   
Both sections 30 and 31 of the South African Bill of Rights were considered in 
the case of MEC for Education: Kwa Zulu-Natal and Others v Pillay Case.156  
The case was actually brought as a case of unfair discrimination under the 
Equality Act of 2000, which was passed to give effect to sections 9(3) and (4) 
of the Constitution with both religion and culture included as prohibited 
grounds of discrimination.  The case concerned the school‟s refusal to permit 
Ms Pillay‟s daughter, Sunali, to wear a nose stud at school.  The Court noted 
that the right to non-discrimination was distinct from the protection provided by 
sections 15 and 30 but that the two might overlap „where the discrimination in 
question flows from an interference with a person‟s religious or cultural 
practices.‟157  The court therefore had to establish firstly whether or not there 
                                                        
154 George Edwin Devenish, A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (Butterworths 1999). 
155 On the history of the minority and language rights regime generally in South Africa, see Kristin 
Henrard, 'Language Rights and Minorities in South Africa' (2001) 3 International Journal on 
Multicultural Societies 78. 
156
 CCT 51/06 [2007] ZACC 21. 
157 Ibid.. para. 46. 
was such an interference, applying a similar approach to sections 15 and 
30. 158   What is particularly interesting about the judgment is the lengthy 
discussion of the relationship between culture and religion159 with the former 
regarded as more personal, the latter more related to community based 
traditions and beliefs.160  It was accepted that the wearing of a nose stud was 
a voluntary practice but one that Sunali considered formed an important part 
of her South Indian Tamil Hindu religion and culture161 and one that required 
protection in conformity with the affirmation of diversity in the South African 
Constitution.162  The finding of the court was that there was discrimination on 
the grounds of both religion and culture and that this discrimination was unfair.  
The Court took into account the extensive consultation of the school in 
producing the school uniform code163 but stressed that this did not protect the 
decision against subsequent review.164  It was found that exemptions would 
also have an educational advantages in „a multicultural South Africa where 
vastly different cultures exist side-by-side‟.165 
 
Justice O‟Regan in her judgment also made reference to section 31 and 
stated that the constitutional references to culture made it clear that it was 
conceived as involving „associative practices and not individual beliefs‟166 and 
that associative practices should therefore be treated differently.167  Whilst 
Chief Justice Langa‟s judgment was very much focused on the subjective 
experiences of Sunali, O‟Regan‟s view was that the question should have 
been whether the practice was pursued by a particular cultural community 
rather than forming part of an individual‟s sincerely held beliefs.168  In her view 
the concept of culture adopted was that which refers „to the way of life of a 
particular community‟169 but that recognises, citing Benhabib, that cultures are 
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also dynamic and contested.170  Her approach is more communitarian and 
focused on the need for solidarity between different communities rather than 
mere tolerance171 and the need to approach diversity through the lens of 
dignity172 in the sense that cultural practices are valued „because they afford 
individuals the possibility and choice to live a meaningful life‟. 173   Her 
conclusion was that the wearing of the nose-study was „a matter of 
associative cultural significance‟ rather than part of her religious and personal 
belief.174  She argued further that there was more of a need for a focus on 
procedures to process applications for exemptions as well as on processes 
for dealing with disputes.175   
 
Whilst the wearing of a the jilbab raises more challenging questions about the 
balancing of the rights of the individual with the rights and freedoms of others, 
the increased cultural awareness demonstrated here is striking.  This is also 
illustrated through a comparison of the cases of Christian Education South 
Africa v Minister of Education176 and R (Williamson and Others) v Secretary of 
State for Education and Employment.177  The claimants in both cases were 
teachers and parents involved in private education who believed that corporal 
punishment should be administered in the teaching and educational context in 
appropriate circumstances in accordance with their Christian faith.  The key 
issue in both cases was whether a legislative ban on corporal punishment in 
schools violated their rights as parents whether under Article 9 and Article 2 of 
the First Protocol to the ECHR in the UK or under s. 15 (individual right to 
religious freedom) and s. 31 in South Africa.   
The Court of Appeal in the UK found there was no interference with the 
parents‟ rights, noting the punishment could be carried out instead by the 
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parents at home.178  Lord Justice Rix in the Court of Appeal had however 
expressed regret at the narrow focus of the argument before that Court 
focusing on the issue of interference, which meant that the court didn‟t have to 
address the issue of the balancing of different rights and interests, making 
specific reference179 to the case of Christian Education South Africa v Minister 
of Education.180   The South African Constitutional Court in that case had 
proceeded on the assumption that both rights were at issue following an 
extensive discussion of the significance of s. 31 and the emphasis on the 
practice of religion in community with others.181  The Court‟s main focus was 
on the general limitation clause in section 36 and the issue of whether or not 
the failure to accommodate such beliefs and practice could be accepted „as 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, freedom and equality.‟182  The rights of the parents were balanced 
against the rights of the child and the dignity clause 183  and the overall 
conclusion was that the interference was not disproportionate to the overall 
aim184  
The House of Lords in Williamson focused on the limitations of the right in 
Article 9(2).  Although the same overall conclusion that there was no violation 
was reached, more attention was clearly given in the South African case to 
the group dimension and the cultural aspect.  Meanwhile Lord Walker referred 
to the „more nuanced and contextual‟ approach to the issue of limitations on 
religious rights by the South African Constitutional Court „even if that sort of 
approach has some tendency to blur rigid distinctions between the issues of 
engagement, interference, and justification.‟ 185   It is clear that the South 
African Constitution has a very different historical and social context.186  It is 
submitted nonetheless that lessons can be learnt by the greater cultural 
sensitivity shown by the South African Constitutional Court.  
                                                        
178 R (Williamson and others) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2002] EWCA Civ 
1926; [2003] QB 1300. 
179 Ibid., para. 116. 
180 Case CCR 4/00 [2000] ZACC 11 
181 Ibid., paras 20- 27. 
182 Ibid., para. 32.  
183 Ibid., para. 15. 
184 Ibid., paras. 50-52. 
185 House of Lords, supra n.  177, para. 68. 
186 Ibid., para. 67. 
7  CONCLUSION: IS THE INCLUSION OF A RIGHT TO CULTURAL IDENTITY IN A UK BILL 
OF RIGHTS THE WAY FORWARD? 
 
It has been argued here the neglect of debates about the accommodation of 
diversity and difference in the UK Bill of Rights process to date has been 
regretable.  This contrasts significantly with the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights 
process, where issues relating to culture, identity and language were at the 
forefront of the debates. 187   Perhaps unsurprisingly in the current anti-
European political climate,188 the focus so far amongst many who might have 
been expected to raise such issues has been on safeguarding the rights 
guarantees and the rights protection framework of the Human Rights Act 
1998.  Whilst it is clear that this debate will continue, the fact that the 
Commission on a Bill of Rights declined to advocate the inclusion of economic 
and social rights in a UK Bill of Rights means that there is now the opportunity 
for more debates around a common heritage and in relation to culture, identity 
and language issues.  Such issues have been central to debates about the 
accommodation of diversity in UK in the past and the UK has been a party to 
the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, a Council 
of Europe treaty that addresses many of the issues most pressing for those 
belonging to minority groups, since 1999.  The inclusion of a provision 
analogous to Article 27 of the ICCPR in a UK Bill of Rights would appear to be 
an obvious next step in relation to the State‟s undertakings in relation to those 
belonging to minorities.  The fact that Article 27 is included in the sister 
document to the ECHR focused on civil and political rights ensures that a 
case can be made for its inclusion separate to the ongoing debates over the 
inclusion of other „categories of rights in such a bill. This certainly appears to 
be the view of the UN Human Rights Committee, which has noted that there 
are rights in the ICCPR excluded from the ECHR and called for all such rights 
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to be protected and given effect in UK law, 189  including Articles 26 (the 
equality guarantee) and 27 and with same levels of protection as other civil 
and political rights.190  Only minor modifications to the Human Rights Act 1998 
would be required to facilitate this.  Meanwhile Special Rapporteur Capotorti, 
in his report on Article 27, had argued that a universally applicable, indeed 
desirable, approach to the implementation of Article 27 was for the rights to 
culture and language to be recognised in domestic laws.191  
The unpredictability surrounding the legal transplantation process is well 
known.192  We do however have the advantage of being able to look to other 
jurisdictions as well as to the HRC‟s own case-law on Article 27, which 
provide no indication of a threat to „European‟ values or to the rights and 
freedoms of individuals. A right based on the formulation of Article 27 of the 
ICCPR is included in both the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (s. 20) and the 
South African Bill of Rights (s. 31).  The evidence presented here suggests 
that the inclusion of such a right ensures that the importance of cultural 
identity to individual well-being is sufficiently recognised and that the more 
communal aspects of culture, religion and language are not completely 
sidelined.  As with other rights in these instruments, the rights are limited and 
should not therefore be seen as a constituting a threat to social cohesion or 
as a means of encouraging extremism. The issue of how to ensure a balance 
between protecting and promoting cultural identity and ensuring social 
cohesion has been the subject of considerable international attention.  The 
inclusion of such a provision in a UK Bill of Rights would hopefully result in 
greater cultural awareness in the courts and would sit well alongside an right 
to equality and/or non-discrimination in any future UK Bill of Rights. 
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